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Abstract 
The reduction of Greek sovereign debt by €106 billion, agreed in the second bailout 
package of February 2012, is the largest in history. Nevertheless, immediately after 
publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose whether it would achieve its goals: to 
reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 120.5% in 2020 and to ensure the return of Greece to market 
financing by 2015.  
This Briefing gives a timely input to the debate as it develops an analytical 
framework through which the expected failure of the Greek debt reduction can be assessed. 
It surveys the economic literature to identify three groups of factors reducing the 
effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring: (1) sovereign’s fundamentals, (2) inefficiencies 
inherent in the restructuring process and (3) costs of restructuring; and applies them to the 
case of Greece. 
Based on this analysis, three policy implications are formulated, with relevance to 
Greece and the wider eurozone. Firstly, the importance of increased policy effort by Greece 
to enact current structural and growth-enhancing reforms is underlined. Secondly, the 
introduction of uniform CACs is proposed that will reduce the market participants’ 
uncertainty, discipline the runs on government debt and address the holdout inefficiency. 
Finally, sovereign debt restructuring is not recommended as a universal solution for over-
indebtedness in the EU, given the direct and reputation costs of sovereign debt restructuring 
and the self-fulfilling nature of sovereign debt crises. 
Keywords: sovereign debt, debt restructuring, eurozone, Greece 
JEL codes: F15, F33, F34, F36, G01, G24, H63  
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1 Introduction 
“Fair Greece! Sad relic of departed worth! 
Immortal, though no more; 
though fallen, great! 
Who now shall lead thy scattered children forth, 
And long-accustomed bondage uncreate?” 
Lord George Byron (1812): Childe Harold's Pilgrimage,  
Canto II, Stanza 73 – 74. 
The second bailout package for Greece, finalised on 21st February 2012 under its 
official name of ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece’, paved the way 
for the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history, equal to almost €106 billion. For the 
first time in the EU, sovereign debt of a Member State (MS) was to be reduced through a 
haircut of above 50% negotiated with private creditors. Economists (Buchleit and Gulati 
2010, 2011; Economides and Smith 2011; Gulati and Zettelmeyer 2012) have called upon 
restructuring of Greek debt since 2010 as a way out of the sovereign debt crisis.  
Nevertheless, soon after publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose 
whether it would achieve its primary goals: to reduce the Greek debt from current 164% to 
120.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020 and to secure the return of Greece to the 
capital markets by 2015.  
This Briefing gives a timely input to the debate as it develops an analytical framework 
through which the potential failure of the Greek debt reduction can be assessed. It surveys the 
economic literature to identify three groups of factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign 
debt restructuring:  
1) the fundamentals of the debtor (its inability to retain sustainability of the debt); 
2) the coordination problems and market failures in the form of holdout, funding and 
adjustment inefficiency; 
3) the costs of sovereign debt restructuring, particularly the reputation and domestic 
costs. 
As will be shown in the case study of Greece, the three arguments relate to the specific 
situation of the second bailout package to a varying degree. Most of all, Greece will face the 
problem to regain its debt sustainability because of the macroeconomic fundamentals: its 
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inability to sustain external surpluses coupled with low growth outlook for the economy that 
will exacerbate the difficulty of achieving primary balances necessary to reach debt 
sustainability. The target of Greek access to the markets in 2015 is likely to be missed due to 
the lack of incentives for creditors to invest in Greek government securities in the mid-term 
and political uncertainty and administrative incapacity to enact necessary reforms in the short-
term. The holdout, funding and adjustment inefficiency are not likely to significantly affect 
the debt restructuring period, while the reputation implications of restructuring are valid both 
for Greece, but most importantly for the eurozone as a whole. 
Based on this analysis, three policy implications are formulated, with relevance to 
Greece and the wider eurozone. Firstly, the importance of increased policy effort by Greece to 
enact structural and growth-enhancing reforms is underlined. Secondly, the introduction of 
uniform CACs is proposed that will reduce the market participants’ uncertainty, discipline the 
runs on government debt and address the holdout inefficiency. Finally, sovereign debt 
restructuring as a universal solution for over-indebtedness in the EU is not recommended, 
given the direct and reputation costs of sovereign debt restructuring and the self-fulfilling 
nature of sovereign debt crises. 
This Briefing is structured as follows. Chapter 2 shortly defines debt restructuring. 
Chapter 3 analyses the caveats of debt restructuring as a solution to over-indebtedness, 
forming three hypotheses on factors diminishing effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring. 
Chapters 4 and 5 apply the analytical framework to Greece and draw the policy implications, 
accordingly. The conclusions are summarised in Chapter 6. 
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2 Restructuring sovereign debt: why and how? 
“A national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing” 
Alexander Hamilton, in a letter to Robert Morris, 1781. 
The problems of unsustainable levels of sovereign debt are not new1, yet the solutions 
used in case of insolvency or illiquidity of a country and the source of debt financing changed 
over time (Sawicki 2011, p.1). Before the introduction of Brady bonds2 in 1989, sovereigns 
borrowed through bilateral country-to-country loans or banking credit, often with no 
guarantees of government institutions. Today most of the sovereign debt is issued on bond 
markets by state institutions and bought by numerous creditors. The restructuring process thus 
requires negotiation with a wide range of creditors of different types, rather than one big 
financial institution or creditor country. 
There is no universal numerical rule of what constitutes an unsustainable level of 
sovereign debt. As de Grauwe (2011) pointed out, the markets perceive the 90% of sovereign 
debt in the UK as more sustainable than 72% of debt in Spain, pricing the government bonds 
of Spain 200 basis points higher than those of Great Britain. 
Nevertheless, overborrowing – accumulation of high debt levels, close to the limit that the 
creditors accept – may not be optimal in the long term. It hinders growth 3 , hampers 
investment4 and leads to sharp increases of risk premiums5. It is also one of the primary 
causes of sovereign debt crises, whereby a country is unable to honour its liabilities and to 
obtain new funding at the capital market. In order to avoid the consequences of over-
indebtedness, some form of debt restructuring may be necessary. 
Debt reduction and debt rescheduling 
Sovereign debt can be restructured in four different ways, as presented in the Table 1. 
On the one hand, coupon earnings can be cut or delayed. On the other hand, the payment of 
                                                 
1 In fact, in the last eight centuries financial crises occurred in clusters, with surprisingly consistent frequency 
and similar patterns – see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for their analysis of ‘eight centuries of financial folly’. 
2 The Brady plan was a novel debt-resolution agreement, whereby the creditors (commercial banks) agreed to 
exchange their illiquid claims on developing countries for new tradable dollar-denominated instruments with 
changed payment terms, often including US guarantees. 
3 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) performed a study of 44 countries in the time span of two centuries and found that 
when the ratio of public debt-to-GDP exceeds 90%, the median growth decreases by one percentage point, while 
the reduction of average growth is even more significant. A similar threshold was found by the Cecchetti, 
Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) from the Bank of International Settlements, who applauded the work of Reinhart 
and Rogoff. 
4See debt overhang and underinvestment problem – Sachs (1989), Krugman (1988), based on the corporate 
finance view of Myers (1977). 
5 Roubini (2001); Reinhart, Rogoff and Sevastano (2003); Orszag, Sinai and Rubin (2004). 
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the principal at the end of maturity of the bond can similarly be cut or delayed. In general, 
these options form two broad methods. Debt rescheduling (also described as bailout), in the 
case of postponing/extension of the debt repayments, does not reduce the net present value 
(NPV) of debt. In contrast, debt reduction (also described as bail-in) results in the NPV 
reduction, implying that the creditors incur losses.6  
Table 1. Debt rescheduling versus debt reduction 
 Affecting the coupon Affecting the principal 
Debt rescheduling 
(does not change the NPV of debt) 
Extending the period of coupon 
repayments 
Postponing the moment of the 
principal repayment 
Debt reduction 
(reduces the NPV of the debt, 
creditors incur cost) 
Application of below-market 
interest rates, moratorium on 
interest, forgiving past due interest 
Reducing the principal amount due 
Source: own analysis, Roubini 2001, Sawicki 2011, p.2. 
A decision on debt restructuring requires the assessment of whether a country suffers 
from solvency or liquidity problem (Roubini 2001). Debt rescheduling may be enough as a 
medium-term solution for a solvent but illiquid country that is temporarily not able to rollover 
its debt. In contrast, debt reduction is required in case of insolvency, i.e. permanent inability 
to honour debt obligations. In practice, sovereign debt resolution often includes a mixture of 
fiscal adjustment and additional funding coupled with a reduction of the outstanding debt, 
extending maturity of the debt and cutting the coupon.  
The aim of sovereign debt restructuring is therefore to alleviate the debt burden in a 
way that the country can eventually autonomously pay its liabilities and regain access to 
market funding. However, as the following chapter presents, a number of factors can 
successfully diminish the effectiveness of the restructuring. 
                                                 
6 However, the creditor losses do not correspond to the nominal write-down of the debt, as Cohen (1993, p.25) 
showed in a simulation of a debt write-down. In his example, the debt (1 dollar) is originally priced at 32 cents. 
50% write-off has an impact on the price of debt bringing it to the level of 57 cents. The market value decreases 
from 0.32 to 0.285. Such a result represents only 11% of write-off in real terms and only 3.5% of the original 
1 dollar value of the debt, in the nominal terms. 
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3 Limits to the effectiveness of sovereign debt 
restructuring 
“Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.” 
New Testament, Matthew 6:12 
Economic literature7  proposes three competing answers as to why sovereign debt 
restructuring may fail. Firstly, the underlying fundamentals of the sovereign may prevent it 
from regaining the debt sustainability. Secondly, the process of debt restructuring has inherent 
inefficiencies in the form of holdout, funding and adjustment problem. Finally, the 
restructuring does not happen at no cost. These three aspects are discussed below. 
3.1  Fundamentals of the sovereign debtor 
Hypothesis 1: The success of sovereign debt restructuring is prevented by the 
fundamentals of the debtor (its inability to retain sustainability of the debt). 
Empirical literature, dating back to Cline (1984), suggests that certain macroeconomic 
factors specific to a debtor country yield sovereign debt crisis and default more probable, and 
in the longer turn minimise the chance of a successful debt restructuring process. The 
following macroeconomic variables can be associated with the probability of debt crises, as 
summarized by Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003, p.2, bullets added):  
 “low GDP growth;  
 current account imbalances; 
 low trade openness;  
 tight liquidity and monetary conditions (…); 
 monetary mismanagement (in the form of high inflation);  
 policy uncertainty (in the form of high volatility of inflation); and  
 political uncertainty leading to economic uncertainty (years of presidential 
elections).”  
Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009, p.15) add a few other characteristics to 
the list, namely:  
 higher shares of short term debt, dangerous especially in the event of debt run and 
confidence crisis;  
 low level of international reserves, necessary in the event of currency crisis 
preceding a sovereign debt crisis; 
 persistent fluctuations of output; 
                                                 
7 Three comprehensive literature overviews on the topic of sovereign debt include Kletzer (1994); Eaton and 
Fernandez (1995); Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009). 
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 weak institutions; and 
 previous history of defaults. 
The relevance of the above mentioned characteristics is largely intuitive. Low output 
growth has direct effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio and drives the country into debt 
unsustainability. Similarly, continuous fluctuations of output hinder an economy from 
insuring itself and affect the creditors’ confidence, which may lead to higher volatility of 
interest rates on debt that can suddenly cut off a country from the market. Persistent current 
account (CA) imbalances in an uncompetitive economy indicate that the country depends on 
financial transfers to finance its imports, without supporting its economy with exports. Weak 
institutions in the climate of political uncertainty have problems to enforce structural reforms 
that boost the competitiveness of the economy and thus are unable to increase its ability to 
service the debt. Even worse, weak administrative capacity of the country can be a reason for 
wide tax evasion that further exacerbates fiscal problems of the country. 
3.2 Holdout, funding and adjustment inefficiency 
Hypothesis 2: The success of sovereign debt restructuring is hindered by coordination 
problems and market failures in the form of holdout, funding and adjustment inefficiency.8 
Debt resolution is surrounded by uncertainty relating to coordination problems, both 
among the creditors and between creditors and debtors. Ex ante, when restructuring or default 
is expected by the creditors even though it has not been declared, the risk prevails that 
individual creditors would rush to sell their bonds with the hope to recover a higher value. 
Such behaviour leads to a decline in bond prices and may deter potential lenders from the 
market and accelerate the crisis in a self-fulfilling manner (Gianviti et al. 2011, p. 8). Ex post, 
after the restructuring has been announced, three broad inefficiencies come to the fore: 
holdout, funding and adjustment inefficiency. 
Holdout inefficiency  
The first risk that a sovereign debtor faces is that of holdout, in which “one or more 
creditors may strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debt-restructuring plan” 
(Schwarcz 2011, p.6). Typically, in order to change the payment terms of a contract 
(concerning maturity, amount of principal and coupons), consent of the parties is required. In 
the case of sovereign bonds, this means that any form of debt restructuring requires the 
approval of investors. The creditors that hold out, i.e. reject the restructuring offer by the 
                                                 
8 See Haldane et al. (2003) and Schwarz (2011), for an analytical discussion of the inefficiencies. 
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debtor, aim to receive full payment of the claims at the expense of the majority of the 
creditors. 
The holdout problem is a source of market inefficiency. It increases the burden of the 
restructuring process with litigation costs, but most importantly can be discouraging for other 
lenders to accept the offer and may thus jeopardize the success of debt restructuring. 
Additionally, a country anticipating large numbers of holdouts may postpone the decision to 
restructure fundamentally unsustainable debt, leading to unnecessarily higher costs.  
In order to reduce the likelihood of a holdout problem, Collective Action Clauses 
(CACs) are introduced in the bond contracts. If the contract contains CACs, it is enough if a 
qualified majority (usually 66 or 75%) of creditors agrees to the changes – the holdouts are 
bound by their decision. In the case of Greece, such as solution was not available straight 
away, as 90% of the total debt in 2011 did not contain the CACs (Choi et al. 2011, p.13). 
Funding problem 
The second risk of the debtor is the funding problem, in which a country is unable to 
obtain financing during the debt restructuring process itself. As Chapter 3.3 outlines, debt 
restructuring in a country leads to a number of domestic costs (e.g. need to recapitalize banks) 
and hence necessitates expenses on the side of the country already in trouble. The funding 
problem occurs, because no lender agrees to provide funds, “unless its right to repayment has 
priority over existing debt claims.” (Schwarcz 2011, p.25).  
Funding in the period of distress is particularly important in order to retain the 
confidence of creditors in the country. Restructuring of the debt reduces the pressure on the 
debtor country, but may lead to other runs – be it a run on the domestic banking system or 
withdrawal of cross-border bank credit, when the creditors realize their obligations may not 
be met (Roubini and Setser 2004, p.3). The sovereigns show great vulnerability to such 
reputation risks, that can undermine the entire payment system of the country.  
Adjustment inefficiency 
The final risk, that may prevent the restructuring process from bringing the desired 
results, is the adjustment inefficiency, “whereby the debtor knowing that surplus output will 
be usurped by holdouts fails to exert sufficient policy effort” (Haldane et al. 2003, p.23). 
Additionally, the adjustment inefficiency represents a moral hazard that a country bears, if it 
expects a relatively easy restructuring process – it faces lower incentives to enact reforms 
necessary to regain the ability to pay its debt. Such an expectation can have two reasons. On 
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the one hand, the legal changes that bind the creditors make the restructuring easier. On the 
other hand, a country that is ‘too big to fail’ or ‘too important to fail’ may expect to be bailed 
out, as the creditors and lending institutions hope to prevent a wider economic downturn that 
the default of the sovereign could cause.  
Restructuring of debt is thus often coupled with conditionality – the creditors agree to 
take on certain losses, if they can expect that a country will undertake reforms to increase its 
ability to service obligations in the future. The moral hazard is that such efforts will either not 
be enacted at all, or not properly. 
3.3 Costs of debt restructuring: to forgive is to forget? 
Hypothesis 3: The success of sovereign debt restructuring is jeopardised by the costs 
it incurs, particularly the reputation and domestic costs, specific to the economy. 
Market exclusion and interest rate spreads 
In their widely quoted paper, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argued that participants in 
financial markets are characterised by a very short memory when it comes to sovereign debt 
defaults or debt restructuring. “Debts that are forgiven will be forgotten” (Bulow and Rogoff 
1989, p.49) – they claimed, undermining the body of research that emphasised reputation 
concerns as a reason to repay the debt (Eaton et al. 1986; Grossman and Van Huyck 1988). 
However, as Cruces and Trebesh (2011) showed, restructuring does not happen at zero cost. 
Particularly, the authors establish that the post-restructuring spreads and the duration of 
exclusion from the capital markets are highly correlated with the haircut size, casting doubt on 
the “forgive and forget” belief. It seems that the creditors do in the end impose some form of 
penalties on the defaulting country. 
Costs on the domestic economy 
Empirical literature suggests that debt restructuring decreases the GDP growth rate in 
the year after the default episode, although the precise calculation of the impact varies 
between studies.9 
There are various channels through which debt restructuring affects the economy, as 
was highlighted by IMF (2002) and Darvas (2011, p.5). The channels include: 
                                                 
9 For instance, Sturzenegger (2004) identifies the reduction at the level of 0.6 percentage points and, if the 
default episode is coupled with a banking crisis, at the level of 2.2 percentage points. Sandleris (2012) 
approximates the impact at the level of 1.5 percentage points. 
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 Direct wealth effect on holders of the bonds who see the value of the government 
instruments cut. Eventually, the negative wealth effect on corporations and households 
can lead to a decrease of consumption and investment. 
 Loss of confidence that exacerbates the fall in output and is manifested by capital 
outflows, falling money demand and sharp hikes of interest rates on sovereign bonds.  
 Disruption of the domestic financial system as the banks receive the hit, through: 
o direct effect on the asset side of balance sheets of the banks; 
o bank runs and deposit withdrawals as a result of loss in confidence; 
o interbank market freeze due to the increase of overall lending risk; credit crunch; 
o interest rate hikes, typical to crises, increasing the cost of funding; 
o flight to quality – deposits shifted to other, often foreign owned, banks. 
Because of the costs to the economy, the decision to restructure is not an easy one, but 
even more importantly the success of the restructuring (regaining debt sustainability) is under 
threat. 
Contagion and reputational spill-overs 
The restructuring of the debt can lead to contagion and spill-over effects. Firstly, the 
debt restructuring can start the so called ‘credit event’10 which triggers repayments of Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS). 11  Due to the interconnection of the European banking system, 
triggering CDS repayments could lead to severe tensions, with non-linear or threshold effects 
in financial markets, resulting in widespread market instability.12  
Secondly, debt restructuring sends a signal to the markets that undermines confidence 
in the government bonds, as described in the section on market exclusion. It is particularly 
important in the eurozone, as restructuring represented a change in the official policy stance 
of the EU and shift away from the old principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’13.  
 
                                                 
10 Credit event applies in the case of: (1) failure to pay an obligation, (2) repudiation of an obligation and (3) 
restructuring – change in the contractually agreed coupon or principal (ISDA 2003). 
11 CDS is a form of credit derivative that insures against the risk of default on a given security. In return for a 
quarterly premium (spread), the protection buyer can expect that in the case of credit event that significantly 
diminishes the value of a given instrument, the protection seller will compensate the loss. Since CDS are traded 
mostly on over-the-counter markets, the exact estimation of exposures of banks is not possible. For the case of 
Greece, the impact of restructuring on non-Greek euro-zone banks was a matter of concern (Interview, ECB 
official 13.04.2012). 
12 It would also push into the future the moment when Greece would be in a position to access capital markets 
for its own financing. This in turn, could make it more difficult for Greece to put its fiscal position on a 
sustainable footing, which was the aim of the second bailout package. 
13 From Latin: ‘agreements shall be kept’. 
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*** 
The discussion of the factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring 
forms an analytical framework for assessing the debt restructuring in the case of Greece (see 
Table 2).  
Table 2. Factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring 
Factors Specification Discussion 
Fundamentals of the 
sovereign debtor that 
increase the probability of 
sovereign debt crisis 
 Low GDP growth 
 Persistent fluctuations of output 
 Higher shares of short-term debt 
 Current account imbalances 
 Low trade openness 
 Low level of international reserves 
 Monetary mismanagement 
 Political uncertainty 
 Weak institutions 
Empirical literature identifies 
macroeconomic factors specific to a 
country that yield sovereign debt crises 
more probable. In the longer term, these 
economic fundamentals translate into 
inability to retain sustainability of the 
debt: in such case, even substantial 
reduction of debt does not prevent the 
country from falling into debt problems 
again. 
Coordination problems 
and market failures 
resulting from the design 
of the debt restructuring 
 Holdout inefficiency 
 Funding problem 
 Adjustment inefficiency 
The success of the debt restructuring can 
be hindered when a significant 
proportion of creditors hold out from 
agreeing to the debt restructuring plan; a 
country is unable to secure funding in the 
debt restructuring period; or when the 
debtor fails to exert adjustment policy 
effort after the debt restructuring 
agreement, due to moral hazard. 
Costs of the debt 
restructuring 
 Market exclusion and interest rate 
spreads 
 Costs on domestic economy (direct 
wealth effect, loss of confidence, 
disruption of domestic financial 
system) 
 Contagion and reputational spill-
overs 
The debt restructuring does not happen at 
zero cost. The debtor can be ‘penalised’ 
by market exclusion and higher post-
restructuring spreads; the restructuring 
period is often followed by lower growth 
and domestic financial system 
disruptions as well as loss of reputation 
with possible spill-over effect leading to 
wider market instability. The burden of 
these costs can ultimately prevent the 
success of sovereign debt restructuring. 
Source: own analysis. 
As will be shown in the following chapter, the factors apply to Greece to a varying 
degree. 
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4 Greek debt restructuring in the light of the second 
bailout package 
“If I owe you a pound, I have a problem; but if I owe you a million, the problem is yours.” 
John Maynard Keynes 
The Greek sovereign debt crisis became imminent in late 2009, when the newly 
appointed Prime Minister George Papandreou announced that after revision Greek budget 
deficit would exceed 12%, double the figure previously reported. 14  The ensuing loss of 
confidence in the domestic and European banking system, sovereign debt rating downgrades, 
interest rate hike and effective exclusion of Greece from the financial markets led to the 
conclusion of the first three-year rescue programme in May 2010. The agreement of EU and 
IMF to establish a €110 billion Greek Loan Facility (EU - €80bn, IMF – €30bn) required that 
Greece continued with strict austerity measures to achieve fiscal consolidation, and 
simultaneously restored competitiveness through internal devaluation. As soon became clear 
to the EU authorities, the scale of structural problems that Greece was facing was 
overwhelming for a eurozone country (Interview, EU official 25.04.2012). 
At the outset of the crisis the Greek economy suffered from a number of structural 
problems and competitiveness issues. The levels of public finance were completely 
unsustainable, with expenditure rising by 87% in the years 2004-2010 with only 31% tax 
revenue increase in the same period (Greek Ministry of Finance 2010, p.14). Pervasive tax 
evasion, largely inefficient public administration, serious labour market barriers and 
particularly unfavourable business environment made the country unattractive for FDI. As 
was clear to the Commission later, a serious overhaul of the Greek health and pension system, 
liberalisation of strategic sectors (including energy and transport) and addressing judicial 
shortcomings (lack of competition authority, high cost of litigation, unenforceability of tax 
cases) had urgently been needed (European Commission 2012b). Furthermore, since entering 
the eurozone, the nominal unit labour costs in Greece rose by almost 40% and the minimum 
wage level rose by almost 60% (European Commission 2012b, p.39-40). As these increases 
were not accompanied by productivity boost, the economy became uncompetitive. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme of May 2010 aimed to address the extensive 
fiscal imbalances through austerity. As a result, Greece entered into deep recession with the 
economy decreasing by 3.5% in 2010 and 7.1% in 2011 (Eurostat), while its debt-to-GDP 
                                                 
14 In fact, the government deficit level for 2009 was revised later up to 15.8%. Unreliability of data published by 
Greece was a permanent problem since Greece applied to join the eurozone (European Commission 2010a). 
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ratio continued growing (See Table 3). The economic depression in Greece persisted in 2011: 
industrial production decreased by 12.4% in comparison to 2010 (Eurostat 2012) and over 
110,000 companies in Greece went bankrupt (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2012). The unemployment 
rate rose up to 21% in December 2011 and over 25.1% in July 2012 (Elstat). 
Table 3. Macroeconomic variables for Greece 2000 – 2012 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP growth, 
annual % 3.5 4.2 3.4 5.9 4.4 2.3 5.5 3.0 −0.2 −3.3 −3.5 −7.1
p −4.7f 
Sovereign debt, 
% of GDP 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 100.0 106.1 107.4 113.0 129.3 144.9 162.8* 161.4* 
Budget deficit 
 % of GDP -3.7 -4.5 -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.8 -10.6 -9.4 -7.3* 
Source: Eurostat and ELSTAT; p – provisional, f – forecast, *European Commission (2012a). 
4.1 The context of the debt restructuring 
In July 2011, it was clear that the first rescue programme was a failure. Greece was 
nowhere close to regaining the access to wholesale markets with the yields on 10-year bonds 
above 15% (see Graph 1) and the projected level of debt reaching up to 198% of GDP in 2012 
(Eurostat, European Commission 2011c). The first programme was enough to cover Greek 
needs until the beginning of 2012, yet the repayment of €14.5bn worth of loans maturing in 
late March 2012 stood under serious risk. In October 2011 and then February 2012, the 
second bailout package for Greece was thus finalised. (Eurogroup 2012).  
Graph 1. 10-year Greek government bond yield, 2010 – 2012  
 
Source: Trading Economics, as of 20.04.2012. Events marked by the Author. 
The aim of the second bailout package was to restore competitiveness and ensure debt 
sustainability of Greece, defined numerically as 120.5% of debt-to-GDP ratio by 2020. The 
bailout package assumed that Greece would return to the markets in 2015 and the money 
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provided by the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank [ECB] and IMF) 
would suffice to fund the country until then.  
The key features of the programme included: 
 private sector involvement (PSI) with reduction of the principal by 53.5%, in the form 
of a bond swap15; 
and limited official sector involvement: 
 retroactive cut of interest rates on GLF, so that the spread over 3-month Euribor would 
not exceed 150 bp.; 
 income earned on government bonds held by Eurosystem disbursed back to MS, that 
may pass them to Greece; 
 Eurozone governments passing on to Greece amounts equal to income generated by 
their national Central Banks on their investment portfolios until 2020. 
As can be seen from the Graph 2, only privately held government debt was to be 
restructured, which under the 53.5% haircut corresponded to €109.7 billion. About 86% of the 
bonds to be restructured were governed by domestic law. 
Graph 2. The distribution of Greek debt, as of February 2012 
  
Source: own analysis, based on Spiegel (2011), European Commission and ELSTAT. 
                                                 
15 The remaining 46.5% were structured as follows: 15% paid upfront through European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) notes and 31.5% in new Greek bonds. 
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In order for the restructuring to bring the desired effect, a high 95% participation of 
creditors was necessary. The investors who would agree to the offer, were to swap their bonds 
for a range of instruments: short-term triple-A EFSF notes (a cash equivalent that constituted 
a ‘sweetener’ of the offer), new Greek bonds with longer maturity of up to 30 years and lower 
interest rate (3% in 2012-20 and 3.75% from 2021 onwards), and additional GDP-linked 
securities “with a notional amount equal to the face amount of the new [Greek] bonds.” 
(Greek Ministry of Finance 2012b). The restructuring was thus comprehensive and included 
both debt reduction and debt rescheduling, as well as additional funds to facilitate the fiscal 
consolidation. The total NPV reduction for investors was calculated at around 74%, due to 
lower nominal interest rates on the new bonds (Benedetti-Valentini 2012). 
Nevertheless, immediately after publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose 
whether it would achieve its goals: reduce the debt burden to 120.5% of GDP by 2020 and 
restore trust of the markets by 2015. In a confidential IMF report that soon leaked to the press, 
two scenarios for debt sustainability were presented (IMF 2012a).16 In the baseline, Greece 
had a burden of equal to 129% of GDP in 2020, noticeably higher than the goal of policy 
makers and above what could be considered sustainable for Greece. In the alternative scenario 
that reflected the risks inherent in the process, Greece faced a debt level of 159% in 2020 (See 
Graph 3). 
Graph 3. Debt sustainability analysis for Greece, 2009 – 2020 
 
Source: data from IMF (2012a). Alternative scenario takes into consideration political risk of delays of reforms 
(e.g. privatisation) outlined in the second bailout package. 
                                                 
16  The baseline assumes 50% debt reduction and does not include the decrease of GLF interest rates and 
additional official sector involvement. It is very clear from the report though, that even with those measures 
(Chapter IV), it is highly improbable that the debt level will reach 120.5% in 2020. 
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Scepticism about the success of the debt restructuring was shared by major media 
(Financial Times 2012a, Economist 2012) and top-politicians, including Wolfgang Schäuble, 
German finance minister, and Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the Eurogroup, who admitted 
that a third bailout package may be needed for Greece (Scally 2012, Croft 2012). The aim of 
this Briefing is thus to establish what factors contribute to the expected failure of the debt 
restructuring as envisaged in the second bailout package. 
4.2 What are the limitations to the Greek sovereign debt restructuring? 
4.2.1 Debt restructuring and Greece fundamentals 
Hypothesis 1: The success of sovereign debt restructuring is prevented by the 
fundamentals of the debtor (its inability to retain sustainability of the debt). 
The relevance of factors hindering the ability of a country to regain sustainability of 
the debt (see chapter 3.1) in the case of Greece is presented in the Table 4 and discussed 
below. Four factors: low GDP growth, CA imbalances, political uncertainty and weak 
institutions significantly decrease the chance for Greece to regain the debt sustainability with 
the second bailout package, which lead to the conclusion that Hypothesis 1 is valid for the 
case of Greece. 
Table 4. Factors increasing the probability of sovereign debt crisis 
Characteristic of a debtor Relevance for the case 
of Greece 
Comments 
Low GDP growth High Greece is in a third year of deepening 
recession and does not have positive outlook 
for growth for the next years. 
Persistent fluctuations of output Low Greece does not face a risk of fluctuations in 
output but rather a low or negative output 
growth. 
Higher shares of short-term debt Low The maturities of the Greek debt have been 
extended in the series of debt rescheduling in 
2011 and 2010 (Council of the EU 2011). 
Current account imbalances High Greece has persistent CA deficit and relies on 
foreign transfers to finance its imports. 
Low trade openness Medium According to International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC 2011), Greece scores 
‘average’ in the trade openness index that 
includes indicators for trade policy, capital 
inflows and trade infrastructure. 
Low level of international 
reserves 
Low  Relevant for debtors facing a risk of a 
currency crisis accompanying the sovereign 
debt crisis. Greece is part of the eurozone, the 
currency crisis risk is not relevant here. 
Monetary mismanagement – 
high inflation 
Low Not relevant for Greece, that as part of the 
eurozone gave up the monetary policy 
competences to the ECB. 
Political uncertainty High Social unrest firing up the streets of Greece 
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since early 2010, shaky elections in 2012 and 
the continuing struggle to enact the promised 
structural changes and budget cuts increase 
the risk that the reforms necessary for the 
success of second bailout package are not 
implemented. 
Weak institutions High Greece has a history of high tax evasion rates 
and has been unable to implement reforms 
recommended by the international creditors 
behind the first bailout package. The second 
package poses similar problems to the country 
administration. Most importantly, weak 
government has severe problems to sustain 
primary surpluses necessary to regain debt 
sustainability. 
Previous history of defaults Medium As shown by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
Greece was in the state of default for half of 
the past two centuries and entered the 
eurozone in 2001 with public debt exceeding 
100%. 
Source: own analysis. Characteristics based on Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) and Panizza, 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009). 
Low GDP growth 
The second bailout package relies on certain macroeconomic assumptions which seem 
overly optimistic given the recessionary forces that accompany the deep austerity plan in 
Greece and the weak growth outlook for eurozone (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Main assumptions of the second bailout package 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Real GDP (growth rate) -3.2 -3.5 -6.9 -4.7 0.0 2.5 
Domestic demand contribution -3.6 -7.0 -10.0 -7.2 -1.4 1.5 
Unit labour cost growth rate 4.3 -1.6 -1.0 -7.8 -1.3 -1.9 
CA balance (% of GDP) -14.3 -12.3 -10.3 -6.9 -5.3 -4.6 
Budget deficit (% of GDP) -15.8 -10.6 -9.3 -7.3 -4.6 -2.1 
Primary surplus (% of GDP) -10.6 -5.0 -2.4 -1.0 1.8 4.5 
Sovereign debt (% of GDP) 129.3 144.9 165.3 161.4 165.4 162.1 
Source: selection from European Commission (2012b, p.16). 
Recession deeper than expected was one of the reasons of the failure of the first 
bailout programme and the scenario is likely to repeat. The provisional Eurostat data for 2011 
indicated in October 2012, that Greek GDP contracted by -7.1% rather than the estimated -
6.9%. As of second quarter of 2012, Elstat suggested the contraction of -6.3% for 2012, 
significantly above the assumed -4.7% (Elstat). 
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The second bailout package comes with a new set of structural measures that 
strengthen the recessionary forces. The measures include a cut of minimum wage by 22%, 
cancelling holiday wage bonuses, pension cuts and public sector job cuts, measures 
facilitating lay-offs, privatisation (long term target of €50 billion) and opening up of closed 
professions. In the long term, these reforms are supposed to increase competitiveness of the 
Greek labour market and help to absorb youth workforce. In the short term they will further 
hamper domestic demand and negatively affect the unemployment rates, already at 
historically high levels, with 23.6% unemployed in the second quarter of 2012 (See Graph 4). 
Wage cuts in the private sector are likely to hinder consumer and business confidence – 
currently at historically low levels (Morgan Stanley 2012), which is likely to further aggravate 
the domestic demand contraction. 
Graph 4. Unemployment rate development in Greece 2002 – 2012 
 
Source of data: Eurostat and ELSTAT. 
Graph 5. Sensitivity of Greek government debt level to changes of GDP growth 
 
Source: IMF (2012a, p.5). 
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In fact, lower GDP growth will have serious impact on the debt sustainability of 
Greece in the long term. The debt sustainability analysis by IMF shows high sensitivity of 
debt level to GDP growth. “Fixing the primary balance, nominal growth permanently lower 
by 1 per cent per annum would send debt-to-GDP to 143 per cent by 2020” (IMF 2012a, p.4) 
– see Graph 5, p.17. Despite the substantial debt reduction of the second bailout package, 
lower growth is very likely to prevent Greece from achieving the target of 120.5% debt-to-
GDP by 2020. 
Current account imbalances 
Greece cannot expect strong external demand either, as the economic growth outlook 
for the eurozone is weak. In 2011 the growth of exports of Greek goods and services 
decelerated from 4.2% in 2010 to 3.9% in real terms (European Commission 2012a, p.24). 
In 2012 and 2013 the growth in the eurozone is likely to be negative (IMF 2012b), which does 
not give a prospect for strong external demand for Greece.  
Neglecting the pervasive CA deficits (see Table 5, p.17) is the biggest shortcoming of 
the current package, according to Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator of the Financial 
Times (Financial Times 2012b). The discussion concentrates on fiscal policy that is 
continuously tightened in order to remove the fiscal deficit, but ignores the fact that Greece 
depends on foreign resources in order to finance its CA. The Greek economy is not 
competitive17 and does not have a strong export sector that could support its imports. The two 
largest industries, shipping and transport, were particularly badly hit in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis with revenues decreasing by 15% in 2009 (Berteloot and Hebert 2010), while 
Greek society became used to consumption above its means in the last ten years (Gros 2012). 
The deep-seated lack of competitiveness of Greece and the resulting untamed CA deficit is 
therefore a factor that will lead the debt burden to grow further, minimising the effects of the 
debt reduction of February 2012. 
Greece is, thus, a country with a serious ‘cash flow problem’. The attempts to achieve 
primary surplus through fiscal consolidation are likely to push the economy towards even 
deeper recession, while the CA deficit is likely to hinder the attempts to reduce the total 
budget deficit. Without a boost to competitiveness that could stimulate the external demand 
for Greek products and reduce the CA imbalance, the debt burden is likely to keep on 
                                                 
17 Since 2001, the real effective exchange rate of Greece appreciated by 20% (based on prices) to 40% (based on 
unit labour costs. (Ghezzi and Pascual 2011), making the country uncompetitive in comparison to other eurozone 
MS. The sources can be seen in the deeply rooted structural problems such as high administrative costs, 
increasing labour costs and inefficient publicly-owned enterprises. 
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increasing. At the same time, the process of internal devaluation is likely to have a negative 
effect on nominal GDP and tax bases, compromising the process of fiscal consolidation. 
Political uncertainty 
The success of the second bailout package is further jeopardised by political 
uncertainty in Greece in the years of its implementation. Around the parliamentary elections 
in May 2012, fears of Greek exit (Grexit) from the Eurozone arose, exacerbating the 
historically lowest investors’ confidence (Financial Times 2012c). The parliamentary 
elections of 6th of May 2012 ended in a failure to form a coalition government and had to be 
repeated in mid-June 2012. The newly formed government immediately sought a two-year 
extension of the rescue programme and additional funding until 2017, given the delays in 
structural reform and the worse than expected recession (Hope 2012).  
The government is under high pressure from a society that protested almost 
continuously over the last two years. In the case of the first rescue programme, the 
manifestations intensified before each round of discussion on austerity measures in the 
Parliament. In fact, ‘political instability’ and ‘social unrest’ are named as one of the main 
causes of the failure of the first bailout for Greece in the Troika report of 2012 (European 
Commission 2012b). The risk of further social unrest is significant, given that Greece needs 
further austerity: “Current projections reveal a cumulated fiscal gap in 2013-14 of 5½ per cent 
of GDP. Therefore, substantial additional expenditure cuts will have to be announced and 
adopted by Greece in the coming months.” (European Commission 2012b, p.6). The 
government request for prolonging the programme includes slowing the adjustment process 
with the cuts spread over a longer period, yet it remains to be seen, how much the Troika is 
willing to compromise.  
Addressing the political uncertainty was the main motivation to appoint an interim, 
independent Prime Minister in November 2011. The task of the new government leader, 
Lucas Papademos, who previously served as Vice President of the ECB, was to ensure 
smooth implementation of austerity measures until the May elections. In the period that the 
second bailout package was being negotiated, the leaders of political parties in Greece signed 
legally binding letters in which they promised that they will continue with austerity measures 
until 2020 (Phillips 2011). 
Nevertheless, despite this binding political commitment, private sector creditors 
remain sceptical about political stability in the mid-term (Morgan Stanley 2012, p.6). 
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Regaining investor confidence is indispensable. Without this trust, Greece will not be able to 
return to the markets in 2015 and thus fail to achieve the goal of debt sustainability in 2020. 
Weak institutions 
Finally, the success of the second bailout package relies on the ability to implement 
politically difficult structural reforms (labour market, liberalization of closed sectors, 
privatization, improving business environment). “The debt trajectory is extremely sensitive to 
program delays, suggesting that the program could be accident prone, and calling into 
question sustainability” (IMF 2012a, p.6). If Greece fails to implement these reforms, the 
competitiveness gains and the rebound of the economy will be postponed, compromising the 
goals of the package. 
Policy implementation of the first rescue programme in Greece was at most partial. In 
the words of an ECB official: “No one imagined how bad the fiscal situation was and how 
low the administrative capacity of the state is to actually implement the programme” 
(Interview 13.04.2012). Indeed, as the Troika reported in March 2012, Greek progress in 
“modernising revenue administration and expenditure control, and steps taken in the fight 
against tax evasion and the prompt settlement of payments to suppliers have remained far too 
timid.” (European Commission 2012b, p.1). 18  The inability to adopt reforms – 
“inefficient structures, inadequate access to information and lack of coordination” (OECD 
2011, p.23) – contributed to the lack of confidence of the markets in the financing ability of 
Greece. Unless the administrative capacity of Greece increases significantly, their weakness is 
likely to contribute to the failure of the second bailout package. 
*** 
The first hypothesis is valid in the case of Greece. Greece may be unable to reduce its 
debt burden to 120.5%, because it is likely to enter recession harder than expected, as the 
austerity takes its contractionary toll. Political uncertainty and institutional weaknesses of 
Greek administration will most probably lead to delays of implementation of the programme, 
further postponing the moment of GDP rebound and hindering the process of Greece 
regaining competitiveness, necessary to address persistent CA imbalances and achieve long 
term fiscal sustainability. 
                                                 
18 The size of the shadow economy in Greece in 2007 was equal to 27.5% of GDP, highest in the EU and close to 
the level of Mexico and South Korea (Schneider and Kepler 2011, p.35). As the Commission (2011b, p.13) 
reported in November 2011: “in total, it is estimated that there are 60bn€ outstanding in unpaid taxes. 30bn€ in 
uncollected tax revenues are the subject of court cases – some of which have been running for over a decade.” 
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4.2.2 Holdout, funding and adjustment inefficiency in Greece 
Hypothesis 2: The success of sovereign debt restructuring is hindered by coordination 
problems and market failures in the form of holdout, funding and adjustment inefficiency. 
As argued below, the second bailout package and the accompanying initiatives of the 
Troika (e.g. Task Force for Greece) do address the market inefficiencies of debt restructuring 
in the form of holdout, funding and adjustment. The negative impact of the three 
inefficiencies on the result of the sovereign debt restructuring process will thus be limited (see 
Table 6). 
Table 6. Inefficiencies of debt restructuring that may lead to its failure 
Restructuring inefficiency Relevance for the case 
of Greece 
Comments 
Holdout risk Medium, well addressed Thanks to the retroactive introduction of 
CACs in domestic law bonds, Greece was able 
to ensure participation of 97% of investors in 
the offer. Although the approach that will be 
taken by the government with respect to the 
3% of holdouts is not clear, means to honour 
their bonds are earmarked in the programme. 
Funding problem Medium, well addressed The funding needs in the ‘restructuring 
period’ are provided by the Troika (additional 
€130bn). If Greece is unable to return to 
markets after 2014, it will likely receive 
further EU loans. 
Adjustment inefficiency Medium, well addressed Employing Commission’s officials on the 
ground and disbursement of fund tranches 
conditional on meeting Programme targets 
decreases the risk of insufficient policy effort. 
Source: own analysis.  
Holdout risk 
 The holdout risk in the case of Greek debt restructuring is likely to create minor 
problems, only in the case of foreign law bonds. 
At the outset, the holdout risk was to be mitigated by designing an ‘orderly default’ in 
the form of a voluntary bond swap with private creditors. “You do have the holdout risk, 
theoretically speaking, if you perform voluntary restructuring. But you have to make the offer 
so attractive, that for a private sector bondholder the incentives are clear.” (Interview, ECB 
official 13.04.2012). For this reason, Greece, in coordination with the Eurogroup and the 
IMF, negotiated with the IIF, representing private bondholders, from summer 2011 to early 
2012. The final deal of February 2012 implicitly assumed that at least 95% of creditors agree 
to the restructuring offer and the total sum of debt that could get restructured amounted to 
€205 billion. The very design of the debt swap, including sweeteners in the form of EFSF 
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triple-A bonds, equivalent to upfront cash payment, was to incentivise the investors to agree 
to the deal (Interview, EU official 25.04.2012). 
In the case of domestic bonds, the holdout risk was ultimately dealt with by retroactive 
introduction of CACs on 23rd February 2012 in the Greek law bonds (86% of the bonds to be 
restructured, worth €177 billion). Initially, the CACs were not intended to be used, but as the 
participation rate of 9th of March 2012 did not exceed the required 95% 19  the Greek 
authorities decided to execute the CACs. In this way the nature of the debt restructuring 
changed from voluntary to ‘coercive’ and the holdout creditors were bound to the offer by the 
vote of qualified majority. The bonds governed by domestic law were swapped on 
12th of March. 
 The holdouts of foreign law bondholders could not be forced to agree by retroactive 
inclusion of the CACs. Greek authorities extended the deadline for the investors to accept the 
swap until 20th of April 2012. In the end, some of the creditors holding foreign bonds did not 
agree to the offer (approximately €5.6 billion – Greek Ministry of Finance 2012d), yet the 
total participation rate of 96.9% was sufficient for the success of the restructuring. Funds to 
deal with the holdouts up to 5% are provided for in the Programme. (See Table 7, p.24, Bonds 
& loans after exchange).  
Nevertheless, the uncertainty about how the restructuring would be executed and what 
solutions for holdouts would be used created unnecessary uncertainty among investors, 
contributing to the volatility of Greek bond yields20 (Georgiopoulos and Papadimas 2012). 
The speculation on PSI that intensified from October 2010 led to a rapid increase of market 
distrust towards Greece, and escalated after the restructuring, when the Greek bonds received 
a sovereign debt rating downgrade to ‘defaulted’. 
Funding problem 
Since the debt restructuring of the second bailout package is coupled with a funding 
programme by the EU and IMF, Greece does not face a funding problem until the end of 
2014.  
In the provisional schedule of disbursement for the new programme, the EU and IMF 
plan to disburse €164.5 billion by the end of 2014 (see Table 7) and continue with assistance 
in 2015 and 2016, when Greece is to regain access to market financing. The final amount of 
                                                 
19 85.8% for Greek law bonds (€152 billion) and 69.8% for foreign law bonds (€20 billion). 
20 Greece has not issued debt on the markets since mid-2010, so the yields do not represent the actual cost of 
financing of Greece, but rather the investor perception of the bond riskiness. 
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assistance – €172.7 billion is higher than the officially stated €130 billion, as the remaining 
non-disbursed funds from the first rescue programme for Greece are now a part of the second 
one. 
The funding problem of Greece is thus non-existent in the next years. In contrast to 
developing countries defaulting in the 80s and 90s, Greece can rely on the support of the EU, 
simply because it is a member of a supranational entity (Interview, EU official 25.04.2012). 
EU policy makers have signalled that they stand ready to provide Greece with adequate 
support until it regains market access (also beyond 2015), if the government complies with 
agreed conditionality.  
Table 7. Financing needs and sources for Greece 2012 – 2020 
in billion € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Financing needs 
A. Government cash deficit 12.2 7.1 1.8 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.3 
Primary deficit/surplus -2 3.7 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.6 10.5 11 11.3 
Interest payments 10.2 10.8 11.2 11.5 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 
B. Other government cash needs 6.9 6.3 5.9 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
C. Maturing debt 18.8 15.6 25.4 17 7.8 8.6 5.8 10.5 9.8 
Bonds & loans after exchange 12.8 10.8 18 8.4 4.4 6.9 3.3 6.9 2.4 
EU repayment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8 
IMF repayment 0 1.7 7.4 8.6 3.2 1.4 2.5 3.6 4.5 
Short-term debt 6 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D. Cost of PSI 78.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash upfront 29.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bank recapitalisation 48.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gross financing needs (A+B+C+D) 116.3 29.1 33.1 20.5 11.1 11.5 8.7 13 12 
Financing sources 
E. Private financing sources 3.2 4.3 4.4 13.3 8.9 11.1 8.4 12.7 11.9 
Market financing 0 0 0 7.6 3 5 3.3 7.4 6.4 
Privatisation 3.2 4.3 4.4 5.7 5.9 6.1 5.1 5.3 5.5 
F. Additional OSI 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 
H. EU-IMF assistance 112 24.2 28.3 6.6 1.6 0 0 0 0 
Gross financing sources (E+F+H) 116.3 29.1 33.1 20.5 11.1 11.5 8.7 13 12 
Source: adapted from European Commission (2012b, p.30, 46). 
Adjustment inefficiency 
The adjustment inefficiency was one of the causes why the first programme for Greece 
failed. Anticipating support by the international community, the Greek government had 
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relatively low incentives to enact politically difficult reforms. 21  As was noted in the 
assessment of the first rescue programme for Greece: “On several occasions, there were 
legitimate doubts about the ownership of the programme by the Greek government” 
(European Commission 2012b, p.1). It is an important observation given that the success of 
the second bailout package critically depends on prudent implementation of fiscal policy 
recommendations, timely privatization, liberalization and labour market reforms, necessary to 
allow Greece to fund its future obligations in the mid- and long-term. 
The moral hazard of the government is currently addressed in two ways. Firstly, the 
tranches of the bailout fund are disbursed quarterly, conditional on meeting specific targets by 
Greece. Failure to meet the targets may lead the creditors to withholding the money, as was 
the case with the three-month freeze of the €31.5bn disbursement in August 2012 following 
the uncertainty over the Greek government’s ability to follow the adjustment path. 
Secondly, a special Task Force for Greece was established in June 2011 including 
experts that provide technical assistance for Greece and support policy efforts in three main 
areas: 
 “growth and employment fostering measures to speed up and focus in the EU funds as 
well as to create improved business environment and sectorial measures for energy, 
tourism, agribusiness and waste management,  
 taxes, expenditure control and privatisation,  
 horizontal structural reforms for the labour market, public health, justice, public 
administration and waste management” (European Commission 2011a). 
It is important to note though, that the implementation of the programme remains 
within the competence of Greek authorities, who will now only be supported and advised by 
Troika experts.  
While the employment of the Task Force may well solve the problem of moral hazard 
of the Greek government, another risk appears, namely that Greek society will have difficulty 
accepting “external interference with domestic affairs in conjunction with deep austerity” 
(Morgan Stanley 2012). The social unrest puts pressure on the Greek authorities who in turn 
face yet another incentive to reduce the policy effort. Nevertheless, Greece relies on the 
official funding from its creditors and cannot afford to sidestep the planned reforms.  
                                                 
21 In June 2011, Greek finance minister Evangelos Venizelos suggested that Europe needs saving Greece more 
than Greece does, following the famous Keynes logic: “If I owe you a pound, I have a problem. If I owe you a 
million, the problem is yours.” (Economist 2011). 
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*** 
The second hypothesis does not apply in the case of Greece, as the inefficiencies are well 
addressed. The holdout inefficiency poses problems only in the case of foreign law bonds, yet 
some funds are earmarked for this purpose. The funding problem is solved through 
international loans to Greece until at least 2014. The adjustment inefficiency is partly 
mitigated by the fact that the distribution of tranches of the money depend on meeting specific 
targets. Additionally, the employment of the Special Task Force for Greece shall help monitor 
the policy effort. 
4.2.3 Greek debt restructuring costs and implications 
Hypothesis 3: The success of sovereign debt restructuring is minimized by the costs it 
incurs, particularly the reputation and domestic costs. 
The direct costs of debt restructuring in the case of Greece are limited (see Table 8). 
Since the debt restructuring happened two years after the beginning of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, the markets had enough time to prepare for the ‘shock’ and the risk of the loss in 
value of Greek instruments was already priced in by the markets (see Graph 1, p.13). 
Nevertheless, the restructuring may have serious implications for the eurozone as a whole.  
Table 8. Implications of debt restructuring 
Restructuring inefficiency Relevance for the case 
of Greece 
Comments 
Market exclusion High The bailout programme assumes market 
exclusion until the end of 2014. Serious 
doubts remain however, whether Greece will 
return to the markets from 2015 onwards. 
Domestic costs Medium The direct costs of the PSI deal are equal to 
€78.3 billion, out of which almost €50 billion 
is devoted for the recapitalization of banks. 
Nevertheless, the banking sector is going 
through a difficult period, as the write-downs 
go together with a decrease in the quality of 
loan portfolios, loss in deposits and limited 
access to liquidity.  
Contagion and reputation spill-
overs 
Medium 
 
ISDA declared the PSI agreement a ‘credit 
event’ which led to repayments of about $2.5 
billion in CDS – a relatively small sum. The 
restructuring did not cause particular distress 
on financial markets. 
Nevertheless, the reputation of other periphery 
countries and the eurozone as a whole is under 
question, as markets anticipate that PSI 
restructuring could be extended to other 
countries. 
Source: own analysis.  
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Market exclusion 
The market exclusion that Greece experiences in 2012 is not a direct ‘punishment’ for 
the current debt restructuring: Greece is without access to international financing for two 
years. The second bailout package assumes that Greece will only return to capital markets in 
2015.  
The success of the bailout package is under threat though, if Greece does start 
sustainable bond issues as planned. There are number of problems that could complicate the 
timely market access in 2015 (European Commission 2012b, p.39). Firstly, the reduction of 
Greek debt will only commence from 2014, which may keep investors wary of investing in 
Greek bonds. Secondly, the restructured Greek bonds that are swapped in the current deal will 
be senior to new instruments issued in 2015, which is a disincentive for investors. Finally, in 
2014 around two thirds of Greek debt will be held by the official sector. Since official debt is 
typically repaid first, investors may feel discouraged to invest in subordinate class of bonds.  
If these expectations materialize, the success of the second bailout package will be 
limited and Greece will require another rescue programme. 
Domestic costs 
The direct costs of debt restructuring in Greece do not pose a serious threat to the 
success of sovereign debt restructuring as they will be covered by the bailout funding. The 
costs of PSI equal €78.3 billion and include €29.5 billion of upfront cash payment of the 
EFSF sweetener and €48.8 billion for bank recapitalization (European Commission 
2012b, p.46). In fact, the effect of sovereign debt restructuring on the banking sector was one 
of the main concerns when the PSI deal was being designed (Darvas 2011). As can be seen 
from Table 9, the Greek banking sector held around a quarter of the private debt that was to 
be restructured, while around a fifth was kept by the other European banks. 
The banking sector of Greece has suffered badly in the sovereign debt crisis. The four 
biggest Greek banks reported in April 2012 that the combined write-downs on Greek bonds in 
their balance sheets following the sovereign debt restructuring amounted to €27.9 billion 
(Benasson et al. 2012). It is another hit to the Greek banking sector in the fifth year of a 
recession. More than 20% of bank deposits have been lost only in 2010, the quality of loan 
portfolios is steadily decreasing and the access of banks to international markets is shut off 
(Pascual and Ghezzi 2011). Luckily, the banking sector in distress can rely on official lenders, 
and even more so, if the currently discussed European Banking Union project enters into 
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force. Unless there is a major fall-back of confidence and no recapitalisation of banks from 
the private sector, the domestic costs of debt restructuring do not jeopardise its success.  
Table 9. Distribution of Greek debt under restructuring 
Debt distribution in billion € 
Total debt in 2011 (A+B) 355 
A. Official loans 95 
EU 53 
IMF 20 
Other 22 
B. Government bonds 260 
B.1. ECB 55 
B.2. Private sector (debt under restructuring) 205 
Investment funds, pensions, sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds 70 
Greek banks 50 
Other European banks 40 
Greek social security funds 30 
European insurers 15 
Source of data: Spiegel (2011), European Commission and ELSTAT.  
The outlook for the banking sector remains uncertain though. As the Economic and 
Financial Committee (EFC), that advises the Council, anticipates: “contagion may (...) re-
emerge at very short notice (…) and re-launch a potentially perverse triangle between 
sovereign, bank funding risk and growth” (EFC 2012, p.1). Weakening growth perspective 
and sensitivity of banking sector to investor sentiments may lead to a failure to achieve the 
ambitious goals of the second bailout package. 
Contagion and reputation spill-overs 
The contagion effect of debt restructuring, measured through CDS exposure, was not 
overwhelming and does not pose a threat to the success of the bailout package. The ECB was 
against debt restructuring in the first place, as little information was available about the nature 
and the size of exposures in the CDS market, given the opacity of that market and the fact that 
many market participants are simultaneously both sellers and buyers of insurance (Interview, 
ECB official 13.04.2012). In the end, ISDA did announce the credit event on the day that 
Greece executed the CACs leading to a situation “such that the right of all holders of the 
Affected Bonds to receive payments has been reduced” (ISDA 2012). Nonetheless, the 
auction of the outstanding CDS transactions on 19th of March went smoothly without any 
major hit to any market. It led to repayments of CDS at the level of $2.5 billion, mostly in the 
United States (Whitthall 2012). 
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The reputation costs of the debt restructuring are more important in the case of Greece. 
Greek debt restructuring was the largest performed in history and set a precedent. It was the 
first such restructuring in a developed economy – a member of the powerful EU block and an 
OECD country. As such, it marks a historic moment when ‘pacta sunt servanda’ no longer 
applies and acutely undermines the confidence of investors. Without supply of credit and 
incoming FDI, the future debt sustainability of Greece is under serious threat. 
What is more important, the reputation costs apply to the eurozone as a whole. One of 
the risks that the EFC saw in March 2012 was that markets believed that Greece was not a 
unique case and expected similar PSI deals in other countries of the eurozone (EFC 2012). 
The concern for the policy makers is thus that the markets will not discern between periphery 
countries and trigger self-fulfilling confidence crisis jeopardizing the sustainability of debt of 
the wider eurozone. As a result, sovereign debt restructuring in Greece could put a pressure on 
debt sustainability of other eurozone countries. Uncertainty of the markets and the resulting 
decrease in credit provision and potential postponement of investment decisions can further 
exacerbate the weak growth prognosis, preventing the exit from the European sovereign debt 
crisis. 
* * * 
The third hypothesis is only partially validated in the case of Greece. There are serious 
grounds to believe that Greece will be excluded from the markets for longer than until the end 
of 2014, in which case the second bailout programme will essentially fail. The domestic costs, 
particularly on banks, should not be big enough to jeopardize the success of the restructuring, 
since the programme entails resources specifically to recapitalize the banks. The reputation 
implications of the restructuring are valid both to Greece and to the whole eurozone, and of 
major concern to the European policy makers. 
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5 Policy implications 
“Rather go to bed without dinner than to rise in debt.”  
Benjamin Franklin, 1732 
 As was argued in the previous chapter, the factors jeopardising the success of the debt 
restructuring process stem mostly from fundamental characteristics of the Greek economy: 
low growth outlook coupled with an inability to sustain primary and external surpluses given 
weak administrative capacity (1). To a lesser extent, the process has been put under risk due 
to market uncertainty over the ambiguous nature of PSI and the treatment of holdouts (2). 
Finally, the event is likely to have significant reputation implications, not only for Greece, but 
for the whole eurozone (3). These three findings lead to specific policy implications outlined 
in the chapter. 
5.1 Greek fundamentals: restructuring necessary but not enough 
The first policy implication is that Greece cannot become complacent now that the 
debt burden is reduced, but should rather put particular effort to reform the economy as soon 
as possible. 
The restructuring of Greek sovereign debt was an inevitable step, given the insolvency 
of the country with no access to the markets and alarming prospects of debt evolution in the 
future. Reducing the burden of debt by €106 billion (Greek Ministry of Finance 2012d) is 
likely to give Greece some breathing space, while the bailout loans by the IMF and the EU 
will provide Greece with the necessary time to get back on its feet. The restructuring itself 
does not solve the root cause of the problems though – an inability to sustain primary balance, 
deeply rooted lack of competitiveness of Greece and inefficiencies of a regulatory nature. 
Reducing the debt burden, hypothetically even to zero, will not resolve Greek problems, as 
budget and CA deficits accumulate quickly. 
The measures undertaken in response to the sovereign debt crisis exert downward 
pressure on GDP growth. In the case of fiscally profligate Greece, the most important change 
is the fiscal consolidation – a process that started in early 2010. In the short term, however, 
austerity has increased the recessionary forces that prevail in Greece since the financial crisis 
in 2008. Similarly, economic contraction has been fuelled by internal devaluation of inflated 
unit labour costs that hindered international competitiveness. Both fiscal and labour market 
adjustment has contributed to the current economic downturn. Yet, since Greece is a part of a 
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monetary union, it can neither stimulate the economy through a monetary impulse nor adjust 
its uncompetitive labour costs through an exchange rate. 
In order to achieve debt sustainability in the mid-term, Greece needs growth. The 
potential sources for growth in the short term are difficult to identify though. Cutting taxes 
and increasing government expenditure, as was advised by the opposition in Greece 
(Granitsas and Walker 2011) is not an option, because Greece does not have the necessary 
means. The country is shut off from the capital markets and cannot expect to get 
unconditional transfers from the international community to finance its needs. What is 
necessary, thus, are the structural and growth-enhancing reforms that would raise the 
competitiveness of Greek exports, help attract foreign investment and increase the flexibility 
of the Greek labour market. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, in 
contrast to the first bailout package, puts a prime on precisely such reforms.22 
The exit from the debt crisis relies on more than just sovereign debt restructuring: it is 
crucially important that Greece restructures the economy in a wider sense. The delays of 
structural measures – ranging from product market liberalisation to business environment 
reforms and fighting tax evasion are likely to postpone the moment when Greece can start to 
grow and tap international markets. Overcoming the institutional inefficiencies of Greece will 
thus have a critical role for the success of the programme. 
5.2 Addressing uncertainty of holdouts: towards uniform CACs 
The second policy implication is that the uncertainty of the sovereign debt 
restructuring process should be minimised by harmonising the use of CACs in the 
government securities of eurozone countries. 
Uncertainty accompanying the Greek sovereign debt crisis brought suboptimal 
outcomes. The uncertainty of the market participants about the nature of PSI since late 2010 
lead to high volatility in bond yields and euro exchange rates (Gianviti et al. 2010, p.7). The 
volatility was accompanied by speculation that if the Greek crisis is not properly managed, it 
could lead even to the demise of the euro. The uncertainty continued with regard to the way 
that Greece will deal with holdouts on foreign law bonds, with newspapers suggesting that the 
default on the instruments is inevitable (Georgiopoulos and Papadimas 2012). Such 
speculations negatively affect the outlook of Greece tapping the capital markets in 2015. 
                                                 
22 Six specific categories of growth enhancing measures are outlined in the programme: labour market, regulated 
professions, energy and transport, business environment, absorption of structural funds and judicial reform 
(European Commission 2012b). 
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The restructuring of sovereign debt in Greece could have been smoother and more 
efficient, if all the government bonds in Europe included CACs. It is thus sensible, that the 
Eurogroup and then the European Council decided to introduce standardised and identical 
CACs in all eurozone government securities from July 2013 (European Council 2011). The 
standardised CACs have two major benefits. Firstly, in case a PSI restructuring is bound to 
happen, they facilitate agreement between the debtor country and creditors, reducing the 
length, costs and uncertainty of the process. Secondly, independently from whether 
restructuring would happen or not, they discipline the markets in the sense that they prevent 
rapid changes of market expectations leading to bond sell-offs. At the same time, the CACs 
do not imply increased probability of debt restructuring or default, especially if they are 
uniform among all the eurozone countries. 
5.3 Reputation implications: sovereign debt restructuring in a monetary 
union 
Finally, the case of Greece leads to a conclusion that sovereign debt restructuring 
should not be contemplated as a universal solution to over-indebtedness problems in Europe, 
particularly because of the reputation implications. 
The European Commission defines three problems with sovereign debt in the 
eurozone Member States: liquidity, sustainability and the solvency problem. (Interview, EU 
official 25.04.2012). The illiquidity requires time (debt rescheduling and additional funding), 
unsustainability requires policies (fiscal consolidation, competitiveness enhancing), while 
insolvency requires debt restructuring in the form of debt reduction. According to the ECB 
and the Commission, other periphery countries, particularly Spain and Italy, remain solvent 
(Interview, ECB official 13.04.2012; EU official 25.04.2012), and thus do not require debt 
reduction in the first place. 
Speculation about European sovereign debt restructuring has a nature of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Concerns about debt restructuring lead to higher risks of reduced yield 
and increase in the interest rate demanded by investors. The servicing of the debt becomes 
more difficult for a state, as the amount of interest payments increase. This in turn endangers 
the debt sustainability even more and worsens the prospect of default. 
Once restructuring starts to be contemplated in public, it will have to happen. “If 
Europe starts, as it did at the end of 2010, speak about restructuring of Greek debt, the 
restructuring becomes inevitable. We come from illiquidity immediately to solvency issues.” 
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(Interview, EU official 25.04.2012). The loss of trust in the ability of a government to repay 
its obligations instantly affects its bond yields and may push a solvent, but temporarily 
illiquid country, directly into insolvency. The influence of statements on restructuring on the 
bond yields was clear during the Greek sovereign debt crisis (see Graph 6).  
Graph 6. Greek government bond spreads over Germany and politicians’ statements about restructuring 
 
Source: Mohl and Sondermann (upcoming, 2013). LHS – Greek government bond spreads in percentage points. 
RHS – Intensity of noise talk about restructuring, scaled between zero and 1. Statements on restructuring 
extracted from around 15,000 wire service reports. 
The reputation costs of debt restructuring in one eurozone country can quickly spill 
over to other eurozone MS. The precedent of debt restructuring for Greece brings the 
perception to the markets that some payment obligations in Europe are not honoured. “We are 
crossing the Rubicon here” (Interview, ECB official 13.04.2012) – sovereign debt, allegedly a 
risk-free asset class, is not fully repaid in Europe. This affects sovereign debt as an entire 
asset class, not only of the country under sovereign debt restructuring, but of all eurozone 
countries that appear similar to market analysts. 
A debt restructuring in one MS may undermine investor confidence in the euro as a 
whole. In the case of Greece, this negative effect is luckily relatively small, given that all the 
policy makers constantly repeat that Greece is a unique case that will not re-emerge 
elsewhere. Introducing sovereign debt restructuring as a universal solution could have dire 
consequences for the investment attractiveness of the EU as a whole. This ability to attract 
investment is particularly important in Europe right now, given the weak economic outlook. 
Joanna Dreger Why Is Sovereign Debt Restructuring A Challenge? The Case of Greece 
 
33 
 
6 Conclusion 
The aim of this Briefing was to investigate the risk factors that decrease the 
effectiveness of debt restructuring, with a particular focus on the case of Greece. The analysis 
of three groups of factors: (1) fundamentals of the debtor, (2) design of the restructuring 
(holdout, funding and adjustment) and (3) the costs of debt restructuring, reveals that 
resolving the sovereign debt problems in Greece will be a challenge for two main reasons. 
Firstly, regaining a sustainable level of debt is jeopardised by the fundamentals of 
Greece. The country has a very low growth outlook exacerbated by fiscal consolidation and 
suffers from an inability to sustain primary and external surpluses. GDP growth is likely to be 
compromised as Greece simultaneously follows two adjustment goals (devaluation and 
closing the fiscal gap) which will worsen the recession in Greece in the short term and 
contribute to the alarming level of unemployment. At the same time, the administrative 
ineffectiveness of Greek institutions is likely to cause delays in the implementation of the 
structural and growth-enhancing reforms and further postpone the moment when Greece exits 
recession, preventing debt-to-GDP ratio from substantial decrease. Even with the employment 
of the special Task Force for Greece of an advisory nature, the ownership of the reforms stays 
within the Greek government. 
Secondly, the bailout package is not likely to allow Greece to tap the capital markets 
in 2015 as planned. The scale of the current debt reduction will only allow the Greek 
government debt to fall in 2014, two years after private investors note 74% decrease in NPV 
of their securities, making it unconvincing for future private creditors. At the same time, 
factors like the structure of Greek debt in 2014 (two thirds in official debt) and the continuing 
political uncertainty in Greece discourage investment in Greek bonds. Failure to regain 
market access in 2015 will give rise to a funding problem and necessitate another bailout 
package, possibly coupled with further debt reduction. 
The sovereign debt restructuring in Greece does not only have shortcomings though. 
Retroactive introduction of CACs in the bonds governed by domestic law and ‘sweetening’ 
the offer with upfront cash payment and GDP-linked securities allowed Greece to reach the 
necessary participation rate of 95% and successfully addressed the holdout risk. The 
adjustment inefficiency is minimised too, since the disbursement of rescue funding tranches 
depends on meeting specific targets outlined in the programme. 
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The study of Greece leads to specific policy implications of relevance both to Greece 
and to the European Union. For Greece, it is indispensable to enact the structural and growth-
enhancing reforms as proposed in the second bailout package as soon as possible. The reforms 
will boost Greek growth in the mid-term and are the only politically acceptable way for 
Greece to exit the crisis, as neither unconditional transfers nor expenditure-led boom are 
viable. Even writing off all the debt will not solve the Greek problems, since excessive budget 
and CA deficits accumulate quickly. For the EU, introduction of uniform CACs is proposed, 
that will reduce the market participants’ uncertainty. The political agreement at the European 
Council level to standardise the government securities issued in the eurozone from July 2013 
is thus a positive development. 
Finally, sovereign debt restructuring is not a universal solution for over-indebtedness 
in the EU. Debt restructuring does not happen at no cost: it may lead to market exclusion and 
exert pressure on the domestic economy, particularly through the banking system. In the 
highly interconnected banking system in the EU, triggering CDS repayments could lead to 
severe tensions, with non-linear or threshold effects in financial markets, resulting in 
widespread market instability. At the same time, sovereign debt restructuring has reputation 
implications which spread easily between countries that appear similar to market analysts. 
Given the self-fulfilling nature of sovereign debt crises, speculation about debt restructuring 
makes it inevitable. This reputation cost affects the sovereign debt as a whole asset class and 
has dire consequences for European investment attractiveness, desperately needed in the EU 
given the weak economic outlook. 
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